When Descartes published his ideas in his Meditations on First Philosophy, his ideas were not new, but revolutionary nonetheless. He proposed that there were two separate types of matter or things that can exist independently of each other. These are physical substances and mental substances. The physical can only take up space in the real world and cannot do any of the things we attribute to mental faculties, such as think and reason. While the mental cannot be present in the material world, it can certainly have an effect on what the physical body does. Substance dualism, therefore, gives way to the idea of ​​an immortal soul that occupies a different realm than our physical bodies. The question then is: how do mental substances affect the physical and vice versa? Because obviously when I stub my toe, even if I only feel physical pain, I still feel it as a mental event and, if you will, it affects my “soul”. If these two substances occupy different areas, how can they interact? This is called the mind-body problem and has been discussed ever since Descartes published his ideas in the 16th century. There are two sides to the problem; one deals with how something mental can cause something physical and the other deals with how something physical can cause something mental. The real question we must grapple with is: how can brain processes cause the onset of mental phenomena? Or how can the brain produce the mind, if it does at all? Epiphenomenalism is the idea that mental states are simply byproducts of physical states and raises the question of how mental states could cause a physical state and have an effect on the physical world. According to this view, John Searle compares consciousness to the foam in... middle of paper... now what about the other minds that are in the world? At first glance, his theory seems a bit like property dualism, but upon further examination it turns out that it is not. Unlike many traditional theories of the mind, he bases his theory on what modern science has told us, rather than relying on past theories that he believes are incorrect in their vocabulary. Searle is clear when he states that his view is based on science, and therefore does not require postulating any additional realm or substance, such as Occam's Razor. Therefore, Searle's biological naturalism is adequate in differentiating between property dualism. I believe Searle provides a good account of mind and consciousness, and although his insight falls short in other areas, I believe he has achieved something very important and relevant to anyone interested in the mind-body problem..