Taken literally, federalism appears to be inherently detrimental to the legislative powers of the central government. Sacrificing some degree of authority to a subnational unit can (but not always) lead to a central government that, in simpler terms, does not always get what it wants. This revelation then begs the question: Why should constitutional designers even care about federalism? Especially since shapers will often also be or be part of the government. The answer isn't always simple, but the short version is that federalism is fundamental to democracy. That is, placing limits on the authority of the central government to prevent tyranny. If this limitation occurs out of a desire to invest some degree of authority in separate subnational units, the main conundrum we face is how powerful should these states be? Does it matter whether the constitution outlines their authorities or not? I argue that the specification of powers is indeed important because at the heart of federalism the main behavioral determinant is to whom subnational governments are accountable. Federalism can be analyzed in two sectors: administrative units and federal units. Administrative Meaning: Subnational units are constructed solely for means of organization and implementation. In this model, the central government is completely powerful and subnational governments simply execute decisions made at the national level. This type of federalism has a great advantage: the legislative process runs relatively more smoothly (as far as federal units are concerned). The reason why here are simply fewer obstacles to overcome. When the central government makes a decision, it is passed on to the subnatio… middle of the paper… it becomes a mutual recognition between the state and federal levels of their respective roles in the governmental process as a whole. A constitution that outlines powers also helps create stability and institutional barriers against the tyranny of the central government. Overall, it seems clear that the actual writing of the rules is really important. Works Cited Carey, John M. “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions.” Comparative Political Studies. 33(6-7): 735-761. Print. Sept. 2000 "Constitutional amendments". National Constitution Center - Constitutioncenter.org, n.d. Web. March 16, 2014. Devas, Nick and Simon Delay "Local Democracy and the Challenges of State Decentralization: An International Perspective." Local government studies. 32(5): 677-695. 2006Heller, William B. “Lecture Notes.” Binghamton University, SUNY Note February 6 2014